This Article examines a phenomenon I call complexity profiteering, in which firms add needless complexity to extract profit without adding value. A popular proposed solution to complexity profiteering is design-specific regulations such as bans on parts pairing, bans on the sale of product features such as heated car seats by monthly subscription, or mandatory USB- C charging ports to be included on all smartphones. I argue that these solutions, which I call complexity prohibitions, often undermine the fight against complexity profiteering. Empirically, prohibitions are circumvented in the short run and become self-defeating in the long run, as iterative cycles of bans and workarounds ultimately drive regulators toward micromanaging product design. Such micromanagement expands exploitable complexities and raises consumer prices. Sequential game-theory models show how compliance costs accumulate and get passed on to consumers, disproportionately harming small firms. Normatively, the Article challenges existing works’ frequent and easy appeals to democracy. Consumers’ stated preferences for repairable products contradict their revealed preferences because they overwhelmingly purchase sleeker, harder-to-repair devices. When markets already supply both repair-centric and beauty-centric designs, uniform design mandates in favor of repairability tend to impose minority preferences on a majority. Moreover, the costs of misguided design micromanagement are much higher than the costs of mistaken consumer choices. Market errors are typically narrow and quickly reversible once consumers start to buy different products. In contrast, regulations that micromanage product design and inadvertently outlaw useful designs or technologies are far-reaching, sticky, and slow to unwind. Instead of complexity prohibitions, the Article proposes a demand-side, information-first alternative: help consumers vote with their wallets. A state-hosted Buyer Beware Platform (BBP), linked to products at the point of sale via QR codes, would crowdsource information and verify signals of complexity profiteering, using AI-assisted summaries to avoid information overload. Transparent, accessible information would reintroduce competitive discipline, break the cost spiral modeled in Part I, preserve consumer choice, and remain cheaper than the perpetual enforcement of design-specific rules. Where market competition is unavailable—for example, single- supplier agricultural equipment—targeted regulation remains necessary. This Article does not argue for anti-regulatory maximalism, but instead argues for regulatory pragmatism. As Part I explains, regulations narrowly tailored to specific, verifiable objectives remain effective and appropriate, and this Article’s critique is directed at complexity prohibitions specifically. I argue for information tools that harness market correction when feasible and reserve micromanagement for true edge cases.
